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Abstract: This paper discusses the avenues through which a public implementation of 
blockchain could deliver efficiency gains in the running of a government. We discuss some of 
the current inefficiencies in recordkeeping and the efficiency improvements that could come 
about if recordkeeping, including keeping track of tax liability, would be “put on the 
blockchain”. We discuss some of the current issues with transaction costs and property rights 
that governments face and how these could be addressed with blockchain. We also discuss 
issues with asymmetric information in general and moral hazard in particular that are ripe in 
the delivery of public services and how blockchain could be used to reduce them to achieve 
efficiency gains and better outcomes for public policy. 
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Governments control a large share of modern economies. The share of government in GDP 
is over 30% for all but two OECD countries and over 50% for eight countries, including 
Finland, France and Denmark at the top end (OECD, 2017). Taxpayer money funds schools, 
public healthcare, emergency services, infrastructure, law and enforcement, national 
security, welfare system and many other services that are enjoyed by all citizens. By 
definition governments are huge bureaucracies, and the sheer size of governments is bound 
to create inefficiencies. How much tax payer money is spent on tracking tax liability and 
payments? How much of the tax owed is not paid when, due to incomplete information, the 
cost of determining everyone’s tax liability may not be in the best interest of the 
government? Unemployment benefits protect workers from sudden loss of employment 
until they find a new job but at the same time diminish the incentive for the recipients to 
look for employment. How much more is paid in unemployment benefits than would be if 
we could somehow remove this moral-hazard issue? Similarly, the public health system is a 
key part of developed economies but the system, as any insurance provided, may give 
citizens less of an incentive to look after their own health. How much more do the taxpayers 
pay towards treatments because of this moral-hazard issue? These are but some of the 
examples of inefficiencies in governments that are created by issues with record-keeping, 
informational asymmetry and transaction costs. What if there was a mechanism that could 
reverse some of this waste and improve government efficiency? This paper discusses the 
role that blockchain technology could play in correcting for inefficiencies in government, 
focusing on possible solution to recordkeeping, informational asymmetry, moral hazard and 
transaction costs.  
The majority of current literature on blockchains discusses the benefits blockchain 
technology can have to improve recordkeeping, which is the focus of section 2 of this paper. 
Improved recordkeeping has a wide range of economic implications - the reduced cost of 
intermediation in the economy has the possibility to increase GDP and reduce inefficiency. 
The areas where improvement in recordkeeping would be fruitful are endless and include 
the determination of tax liability, tracking of royalty payments for uses of intellectual 
property and auditing of company financials or health and safety practices.   
Information symmetry is a critical component of the perfect market but very seldom 





information. We argue that with an increase in transparency, public sector bodies may find a 
wider pool of viable bidders, lowering the expected cost of public procurement. We discuss 
how improvements in transparency around taxation may increase of tax revenue from both 
individuals and corporations due to diminished tax avoidance or evasion efforts.  
One of the most promising areas for the use of blockchain is combatting issues with 
moral hazard that arise when parties in a transaction have incomplete information on each 
other. Moral hazard issues are apparent in health or unemployment insurance. Incomplete 
information allows the insured party to engage in actions or transactions, unobservable to 
the insurer, that are detrimental to the insurer as they pay costs that are not correctly 
incorporated in insurance premiums. Incomplete information also affects decision-making 
when the decisions are delegated, which is known as the principal-agent problem. The agent 
takes action on behalf of the principal, and when information is incomplete and the principal 
is not able to fully monitor the behaviour of the agent, the agent may not make decisions that 
best benefit the principal. The government acts as the agent when it makes decisions on 
behalf of the society. It also acts as the principal in government procurement. Furthermore, 
the government acts as an insurer to many areas of the economy, such as the central banks’ 
role as lender of last resort, public healthcare insurance and unemployment or welfare 
benefits. Blockchain provides the ability to increase the availability of information and impose 
smart contracts that limit the negative costs inflicted on the government from these market 
inefficiencies. 
In section 4 we investigate the assignment of property rights and the possible 
implications of using a government-backed cryptocurrency to define and to enforce property 
rights. We investigate intellectual property for new innovations, the collection, storage and 
ownership of personal information and the piracy of creative works. It is very important to 
have clearly-defined intellectual property rights for new innovations as they are key drivers 
of growth in an economy. It is also important to think about who has the right to information 
about an individual. Currently, a lot of personal information is being collected, stored and 
used for commercial purposes without the individual having access to it, which means that 
the individual cannot decide what happens with data about him or her and cannot transfer it 
to a party when it would be in his or her or even the society’s best interest to do so. This 
creates issues that can have far-reaching consequences. Music and TV piracy are causing 





works. Each of these problems either stems from poorly defined property rights or property 
rights which are difficult to enforce, both of which may be able to be solved through the use 
of blockchain technology. 
We discuss the different blockchain types and their suitability for public bodies in 
Section 5. Some trade-offs exist between the ideal characteristics for recordkeeping - 
correctness, decentralization and cost efficiency – and there is no one blockchain type that 
dominates the others in all situations. 
A new technology, such as blockchain, is likely to be very expensive to implement. 
Because of that, the decision makers need good estimates of the impact that blockchain can 
have for a firm, an industry or the economy as a whole to be able to decide if the technology 
makes cost-benefit sense. Section 6 discusses strategies for ex-post empirical investigations 
of the impact of blockchain technologies and covers both micro studies focusing on individual 
blockchains and macroeconomic studies focusing on a country as a whole.   
Section 7 concludes and offers some ideas for future research.  
 
2. Recordkeeping 
Improved recordkeeping affects the economy through reduced intermediation costs, such as 
the costs of auditing, tracking down tax liability and ensuring that the owners of intellectual 
property rights receive compensation from the usage of their intellectual property. 
Essentially, recordkeeping provides the means to facilitate transactions and to enhance 
traceability. At each stage of a product’s release to the market, information is created, and 
this information can be collected for the purpose of certification, traceability and marketing. 
A company may want to keep track of the quality of raw materials used in production, the 
techniques used to produce the good, how long a perishable item is in transit and the 
locations it has travelled. It may be crucial that this information is recorded in an irrefutable 
but accessible way to ensure to the final customer that the information is legitimate and has 
not been tampered with.  A firm that collects and records this information prices the costs of 
these tasks into the product itself. As such, any new technology that has the ability to 
decrease the cost of information-attainment process, such as an irrefutable, accessible 
blockchain, not only reduces the cost of collecting and storing information but also the prices 
of final goods. As verification costs decrease, markets grow with an increase in the number of 





blockchain has the ability to enhance labour productivity and thus GDP per capita through 
reducing inefficiencies in the collection of data. 
An area of recordkeeping where blockchain technology would give obvious and 
immediate benefits to government is taxation. The costs of tax administration are driven by 
the difficulties in identifying taxpayers, assessing tax liability, collecting taxes and enforcing 
tax payments. In Indonesia, for instance, the average cost of local tax administration as a 
percentage of revenue generated is estimated to be over 50% - thus out of each rupiah  
collected, citizens get at best .5 rupiah worth of services (Lewis, 2006). In New Zealand, 
problems with the current system are high costs of compliance and administration (Inland 
Revenue, 2015). These two examples suggest that modern taxation systems could be greatly 
improved upon. A nationally-implemented blockchain with the purpose of recording all 
transactions could lead to an automatically-generated goods-and-services-taxation reports 
that bypass the need for individual reporting, eliminating human error. Traditional 
cryptocurrency blockchains contain irrefutable information about transaction costs, the 
buyer and seller and the time of transaction. A year-to-year ledger of an individual’s or a 
business’s inflows and outflows would provide a net position and thus the net tax payable of 
that year. This type of taxation system would be entirely transparent and involve minimal 
input from third parties, greatly reducing the compliance and administration costs involved 
in the taxation system.  
Academic research on integration of blockchain technology into taxation systems has 
been limited, but such integration would likely be immensely beneficial for increasing the 
proportion of tax liability that is received by a nation’s government. The most notable 
research into a possible blockchain taxation system was conducted by analysing VATCoin – a 
“cryptotaxcurrency” (Ainsworth et al., 2016; 2018). VATCoin works in tandem with Digital 
Invoice Customs Exchange (DICE) – a scheme created by the EU with the intent of increasing 
taxation compliance and reducing fraud through a technologically intensive system with real-
time transaction documentation. The VATCoin/DICE system is proposed to heavily reduce the 
estimated annual 150 billion Euro fraud costs in VAT payments. The practical implementation 
of such a system is yet to be seriously pursued, however.  
Transparency may also have more direct financial advantages for public sector bodies. 
Armstrong et al. (2011) show that information asymmetry can act as an independent risk 





results can be extrapolated to the public sector and the credit rating of a sovereign state. This 
could be of significant interest to countries with less favourable credit ratings as a potential 
way to assure investors and to expand the country’s financial system (Chinn & Ito, 2002). 
 
3. Informational asymmetry 
The idea of a ‘perfect market’ is economic utopia that is rarely actually experienced in the real 
world as it requires costless exchange which itself requires all individuals to be have full 
information on the preferences and transactions of others. However, if we were to get close 
to this, social welfare would be improved (Riley & Hirschleifer, 1979).  Maximising possible 
transparency of information is necessary in the public sector to protect against corruption or 
misuse of public funds and should be at the height of public interest across the globe. 
Reducing information asymmetry lends economic advantages beyond a lack of corruption, 
spanning the complete reach of public services. Many of the benefits from reduced 
information asymmetry come about due to the mitigation of the principal-agent problem and 
moral hazard issues that improved information delivers.   
The supply chain is an important part of government services. As governments are 
often unable to provide the expanse of public services completely on their own, public goods 
and services can involve a complex network of contracts, all with critical procurement 
processes with the public sector acting as a buying agent on behalf of the general public. In 
the interest of the best possible outcome for public funds, information asymmetry is highly 
undesirable between the public body and either contractors or the general public. Yang et al., 
(2009) discuss supplier reliability and its impact on designing contracts. Asymmetric 
information leads to sub-optimal contracts, high costs associated with reducing the 
asymmetry and unwillingness of managers to engage with riskier parties thus limiting the 
number of potential bidders.  This means that improving transparency in contractual 
relationships has the potential to lower the cost of public procurement. 
The ability for a government to collect tax enables it to undertake projects that 
enhance the welfare of its citizens. We discussed in Section 2 the potential for blockchain to 
reduce the cost of recordkeeping of transactions, which implies both that more of the tax 
liability is recovered and that the cost of the collection is reduced, allowing more of the 
collected tax to be used in social-welfare-enhancing projects. Another problem that 





companies, for which behavioural remedies could be used alongside better recordkeeping. 
While not directly related to tax collection, some valuable lessons can be learned from Van 
Dijk & Grodzka (1992), who detail the effect that information asymmetry can have on an 
endowed person’s willingness to contribute to public step goods. A step good, similar to a 
‘kick-starter’, is one that only goes ahead if a certain funding target is reached. The authors 
find that an increase in transparency regarding the endowments and contributions of others 
encourages those who are wealthy to contribute more. We believe that this finding would 
also apply to the decision of individuals and firms to pay taxes. Evidence in both Australia and 
the United Kingdom has already shown that these types of remedies can yield tangible results. 
Gillitzer and Sinning (2018) monitor the effect of sending reminder letters to small businesses 
about their upcoming tax payments and find that those receiving letters are 25% more likely 
to make a payment on time than a control group who do not receive a reminder letter. 
Similarly, a study by the UK Behavioural Insights Team (2012) study highlights the importance 
of transparency and reports that informing taxpayers that “9 out of 10 people in an area had 
already paid their tax” resulted in significantly higher tax payments. Allen et al. (2016) 
investigate tax avoidance incentives of companies and found that declining coverage from 
analysts and less monitoring from public authorities lead to a heightened aggressiveness 
towards tax evasion. Thus, reducing information asymmetry in the taxpaying environment 
could lead to positive outcomes for tax revenue for public bodies. These results demonstrate 
the potential for increased transparency through a blockchain solution to achieve improved 
outcomes at a potentially lower cost than other more traditional solutions. 
Moral hazard issues arise due to asymmetric information. They arise when individuals 
engage in excessive risk sharing because of actions taken privately affecting the probability 
distribution of their decision (Hölmstrom, 1979). Consider two individuals operating in an 
uncertain environment where risk sharing is desirable. One individual, the agent, takes 
unobservable actions on behalf the other, the principal. The action taken by the agent 
depends on the extent of risk sharing between the principal and the agent. This action then 
affects the total amount of consumption or money that is available for the two parties. 
Governing officials elected to their roles act as agents on behalf of the public that voted them 
in. If the principal, or the public in this instance, does not have complete information on the 
actions of the agent, or the government, the government’s behaviour may not match the 





on the blockchain would increase public information of the behaviour of elected agents. This 
would limit the ability of governments to act in their own private interest because they are 
motivated to serve the principal, the public.   
The principal-agent problem is also found along the public procurement supply chain. 
There is a double nature of principal-agent interactions in politics as the government not only 
acts as the agent but also the principal in procurement. Politicians do not have the expertise 
to implement policies that they advocate and therefore require a set of agents, the regulators, 
to deliver public services (Lane, 2013). The methods used by many governments to ensure 
that agents is acting in the best interest of the government incurs high transaction costs, but 
with increased transparency and reliability of information these costs would be reduced.   
The Government provides many services to the general public that alter the tax-
payers’ incentives in a way that can be negative to the wealth of the nation. Moral hazard can 
arise in these scenarios, affecting government finances and thus public welfare. For example, 
governing bodies that provide unemployment benefits tend to have citizens who are less 
incentivised to be actively searching for viable employment opportunities (Johnson & 
Klepinger, 1994). The reduced effort to look for employment is likely to be unobservable to 
governments that fund the benefit. An individual that has health insurance but smokes has to 
personally pay only a fraction of the long-term healthcare costs if he or she is diagnosed with 
cancer as a result of smoking. The government bears the cost of this moral-hazard issue as 
the provider of the public health services. The natural remedy to the moral-hazard issue is 
investing resources into third-party monitoring of the actions. In simple scenarios this can be 
viable option, in which case the first-best solution can be obtained by forcing a contract that 
imposes penalties against dysfunctional behaviour (Brewer III et al., 1997). However, it is 
often impossible or uneconomical to obtain perfect information using traditional methods, in 
which case the blockchain could play a vital role. 
Systemic banking crises place enormous pressure on national governments to 
financially intervene (Hryckiewicz, 2014). Many countries operate central banks that act as 
the ‘lender of last resort’ in the case of financial downturns. Alongside this, in order to 
maintain the stability and integrity of the financial sector, governments offer bailouts to banks 
that are ‘too big to fail’. Complete deposit insurance, however, worsens the bank’s incentives 
to behave prudently and limits the market incentives to monitor banks, again due to moral 





exposed to more severe liquidity mismatch when they are perceived as more likely to benefit 
from government support. Hryckiewicz (2014) found that government intervention, in 
general, results in a negative impact on banking stability due to increased risk. The systemic 
consequences of moral hazard were apparent in the 2008 collapse of Lehman Brothers 
(Mariathasan et al., 2014).  Government support to banks can be detrimental and, hence, 
should be either limited or designed in a way that ensures the banks bear the costs of their 
risky behaviour (Allen et al., 2015). Limiting the support banks receive reduces the incentive 
of banks to take excessive risk, limiting the risk on taxpayers’ money. Hellmann et al. (2000)  
look into capital requirements to offset the adverse moral hazard effects of guarantees. They 
conclude that while possible to combat moral hazard, this requires an inefficiently high 
amount of capital because of the relationship between deposit rates and capital requirements 
that only become effective when they raise banks’ costs sufficiently to impact the banks’ 
willingness to pay, and thus solutions need to be found elsewhere. Before the Global Financial 
Crisis in 2008, the Central Bank of America never disclosed information about its recipients of 
payments. The banks were able to operate with the knowledge that they use tax payers’ 
money but tax payers did not know where their money was being spent. After the crisis, new 
regulation was brought in with the intention to improve transparency between the public and 
the Central Bank, with mandatory disclosure of recipients and payment sizes. This change 
informs the general public of bailout recipients and works as a deterrent for banks to take 
lender-of-last-resort loans because of the attached signal of vulnerability, potently 
threatening share price and the company value. Blockchain would further increase the 
transparency between tax payer and banks, which would further reduce banking risk.  
Government guarantees are also prevalent in health and life insurance industries. 
Similar to banking bailouts, insurance companies have excessive risk-taking behaviour 
compared to insurance companies without deposit insurance. Brewer III et al. (1997) took 
advantage of the differences in the way guaranty funds are managed across the different US 
states to empirically test the effect of the financial structure of government guarantee on the 
behaviour of life insurance companies. They found that risk-taking by life insurance 
companies was higher in states with taxpayer-underwritten guaranty funds than in states 
without them or where guaranty funds are funded by the surviving industry. The states that 





incentives for the insurance companies to control their risk levels without outside regulatory 
intervention.  
Government guarantees are also found in the insurance policies that governments 
provide though public healthcare. The same moral hazard issue that applies to private 
healthcare also affects public healthcare because of government subsidies. There are two 
types of moral hazard that affect health insurance - ex-ante and ex-post moral hazard (Zweifel 
& Manning, 2000). Ex-ante moral hazard includes issues that arise prior to the incident and 
the insured party’s actions, and subsequent incentive to prevent loss are influenced by the 
presence of insurance coverage. Ex-post moral hazard, however, occurs after the incident. 
For example, when health insurance provides income support, the incentives of patients to 
return to work are reduced. Blockchain creates benefits though the use of a decentralised 
database that provides access to many different parties and has trustworthy information. For 
example, Gem, a United States start-up, is involved in implementing Ethereum blockchain 
technology in healthcare sectors (Mettler, 2016). Storing data on the blockchain reduces 
operational problems so treatment is characterized in a transparent manner with new 
information available to all medical stakeholders. Improved information not only helps limit 
medical negligence but also informs the insurer, or the government, what treatments they 
are funding and the history of patients. Estonia collaborated with Guardtime to operate 
healthcare on a platform-based on blockchain technology (Mettler, 2016). This software 
allows insurance companies the ability to retrieve all information on medical treatments 
performed in Estonia to aid their insurance decisions. The transparency from the software 
reduces moral hazard for government-subsided public healthcare because it limits the general 
public’s ability to hide health information.  
Unemployment benefits are another form of insurance affected by moral hazard in 
many developed economies. Unemployment insurance provides consumption-smoothing 
benefits that a private economy cannot provide. Ultimately, too much consumption 
smoothing can be bad. If the government cannot observe job search effort by the 
unemployed, unemployment is likely to be higher and consumption smoothing will lessen the 
incentives of unemployed to seek employment (Wang & Williamson, 1996; Chetty, 2008). 
Intuitively, unemployment benefits distort the relative price of leisure and consumption, 
lowering the marginal incentive to be ‘actively searching’ for employment. Finally, the same 





would increase the availability and distribution of information allowing payments to be 
verified more easily and thus mitigating this moral-hazard issue. 
The summary of these conclusions is that an increasing exposure to information brings 
many advantages to the public, including in the form of reducing principal-agent problems in 
procurement and government decision-making and reducing moral hazard in policies that 
provide insurance.  
 
4. Transaction costs and property rights 
The term transaction cost has two distinct definitions associated with it. The first definition 
refers to the costs associated with making a transaction, including bank transfer fees, lawyer 
fees and any other third-party costs. It has long been noted that a cryptocurrency could 
reduce these costs as it can cut out a lot of the middlemen that are usually present in 
transactions, but only if a cryptocurrency is embraced by the government as official legal 
tender. The second definition of transaction costs refers to the cost associated with the 
defining and enforcing of property rights, a definition that arose from the seminal works of 
Coase (1937). The Coase theorem states that an efficient outcome can arise from any starting 
allocation of resources if property rights are well defined and costs of bargaining are low.  This 
theorem gives direct guidance to a government for how to facilitate efficiency - define 
property rights and provide avenues for people to bargain (Allen, 1999). 
A government-backed cryptocurrency has some desirable characteristics, such as 
speed, security and stability (Gupta et al., 2017). The speed relates to how quick and easy it 
is to do transactions. A government-backed cryptocurrency allows for transactions to take 
place without the need for intermediaries to authenticate them. This characteristic reduces 
the costs that intermediaries put on transactions, enabling transactions to be done faster and 
with a lower cost. Cryptocurrencies are also very secure, which means that individuals do not 
require a third party, such as a bank, to hold their money. This allows for individuals to have 
stewardship of their money and control where it is used. However, there are some unwanted 
consequences. The main negative effect of cryptocurrencies is that when individuals are not 
storing their money in banks, there is less deposit money available for banks to invest. This 
can be a big problem for the banking system as a whole but could be managed through careful 
implementation of government-backed cryptocurrency. A cryptocurrency is very stable, more 





in individuals withdrawing the money from banks and holding it as cash, setting the lower 
limit of zero to cash interest rates, cryptocurrencies can have negative interest rates as they 
are completely virtual and therefore cannot be withdrawn.  It is this removal of the zero lower 
bound for interest rates that makes monetary policy more stable with cryptocurrency than 
with cash (Koning, 2016). 
Property rights define who have the rights to do something and cover all aspects of 
society from the right to buy a good or service to the right to noise or quiet.  Many property 
rights are already well-defined by law; for example consumers only have the right to buy 
alcohol if they are over 18 and no one has the right to steal property. However, when property 
rights are related to either new issues or new ideas, they can be harder to define 
(Investopedia, n.d.). When people are developing new ideas or new technologies, there is a 
lot of risk associated with the possible return on the R&D investment. Can the innovation can 
be monetized? Can the inventor prevent from using their idea thus diluting any commercial 
gains? This second issue is becoming increasingly important as disseminating information 
with the internet is becoming fast and cheap. Currently, governments use a variety of tools 
to define the rights of use of new innovations, such as copyrights and patents. These tools 
work well but can involve long court disputes to figure out who had the copyright/patent first 
and if people were in breach of the copyright/patent. The costs associated with going to court 
to enforce property rights could outweigh the possible benefits from innovating, which may 
lead to fewer people investing their time and money into it.  This is a key reason why it is 
necessary for property right enforcement to be cheap, easy and quick to enforce as 
innovations are hugely important to economic growth (Foss & Foss, 2008).  
A blockchain has interesting applications to intellectual property. Putting intellectual 
property on a blockchain allows the tracking of who uses it and can then be combined with a 
smart contract to ensure that when someone does use it they also pay for it. A great example 
of this is work done by the World Economic Forum (WEF) in the Amazon Rainforest. The 
Forum is attempting to map the genome for each biological organism in the rainforest and 
then put this information onto a blockchain that has an in-built smart contract. This is being 
done so that anyone who uses this information will have to pay for it. The impacts of this 
blockchain are two-fold. Firstly, there will be money flows back to the countries where the 






Problems concerning information are not solely business problems, and a key problem 
facing today’s society is who has the right to an individual’s data. Currently a lot of information 
is stored in databases and registers, and personal information is often spread across many 
different databases relating to different things. This information covers a wide range of things 
from credit scores to the posts liked on Facebook. Having personal information spread across 
different sources creates inefficiencies. For people to be able to access information about 
themselves they must request it from whoever owns the database, rather than being able to 
access it freely at their leisure. However, data stored by a reputable third party has a 
legitimacy about it that is difficult to replicate by other methods. This is because the party 
that stores the data for people has the data of many people, and thus if the data was 
inaccurate people would stop trusting this data provider and use a different one instead. If 
the data comes from an individual, however, it is difficult to tell if the data is accurate – has 
the individual lied or not. The main problem here is the asymmetry of the information. 
Currently, the solution is to use reputable third parties, but it would be much more efficient 
if individuals had a way to demonstrate that their data is accurate and a way to store and 
keep track of the use of their own data (Zyskind & Nathan, 2015). 
Rights to information is currently a big issue for medical data because as a person goes 
through life they use many different medical institutions, each of which stores data about the 
individual. This makes it difficult for a person to access their data when they need to go to a 
different medical institution (Azaria et al., 2016). The solution to this would be a digital wallet, 
created by using blockchain, which stores all the data pertaining to an individual. This would 
include the individual’s medical history, credit history and all other relevant data. Having a 
digital wallet with this data on it gives individuals the ability to quickly provide their data when 
it is needed. This gives individuals back ownership of their data whilst also providing the 
validity that it needs. A digital wallet involves storing personal data on a blockchain overseen 
by the individual, so the individual can see who is accessing their data and give or take away 
permissions as they deem appropriate. This removes inefficiencies from the economy but also 
gives people power over their own data (Zyskind & Nathan, 2015). 
There is also a huge problem facing TV networks and film and music companies where 
content is leaked online so people can stream it for free. This is a significant problem for the 
producers of this content as enormous numbers of people are getting to see the films or TV 





billion dollars annually. This predicament does not have any easy traditional solutions apart 
from shutting down the streaming sites or tracking illegal users and fining them. This 
highlights the problem that arises from not being able to enforce property rights effectively, 
and until a proper solution is found content will continued to be leaked and companies will 
continue to miss out on large amounts of revenue (Elder, 2016). Again, blockchain is a 
promising technology for keeping track the use of the copyrighted material and ensuring that 
the users of the material pay for the use with smart contracts.  
 
5. Blockchain technology types 
Blockchain is not just one technology but there are at least four types that differ in the way 
they are managed and thus have different outcomes. According to Abadi & Brunnermeier 
(2018), the ideal qualities for a recordkeeping system are correctness, decentralization and 
cost efficiency. However, one type of blockchain, with the possible exception of permissioned 
blockchains, can usually attain just two of the three qualities. True decentralized blockchains, 
such as Bitcoin, exhibit correctness and decentralization but require costly computational 
algorithms to be performed across a network of public miners. Centralized blockchains attain 
correctness and cost efficiency at the cost of decentralization as one sole entity has the ability 
to override, edit or delete entries previously entered on the blockchain (Seth, 2018). 
Centralized blockchains have the possibility of becoming compromised, however. 
Permissioned blockchains, such as used in Ripple, are the most likely solution to the trilemma 
of recordkeeping. Trusted nodes on a permissioned blockchain network can instantly, 
correctly and cost effectively verify transactions entered onto the blockchain through 
consensus measures (Cachin, 2016). It could be argued that permissioned blockchains fail the 
decentralization criteria as they are underpinned by a consortium of entities that grant 
permissions, but nevertheless permissioned blockchains are the closest to attain all three 
aspects of ideal recordkeeping. In our opinion, a decentralised blockchain that is run within 
the organisation is the most appropriate form of blockchain for use in small business and local 
government endeavours. For larger organisations or central government applications, 






6. Measuring the impact of blockchain technology 
Before concluding, we want to touch briefly on how governments can measure the success 
of blockchain technologies in mitigating the issues that we have covered in the paper so far. 
As discussed earlier, blockchain technology has the potential to improve market efficiency by 
improving record keeping, reducing informational uncertainty including moral hazard and 
reducing transaction costs. However, the benefits can be hard to quantify, especially ex ante 
when the technology is new, but a decision maker who chooses whether or not to invest in 
blockchain needs accurate estimates of the benefits. There are a number of blockchains 
already in use and these can be used to get some idea of the magnitude of the potential gains. 
Empirical analysis of the effects of the blockchain technology can be broken down into 
two components – valuing change at the level of an individual blockchain that has been 
implemented for a specific purpose, which we call the microeconomic level, and valuing the 
aggregate impact for the economy of all blockchain technologies used, which we call the 
macroeconomic level. These two levels require differing level of sophistication of 
econometric analysis to identify the impact. 
Finding the effect of an individual blockchain involves first identifying a statistic that 
best captures the benefit of the blockchain and then either comparing that statistic before 
and after or using regression or other statistical analysis. We discussed in Section 3 the moral 
hazard associated with unemployment insurance as the very presence of it reduces the 
incentive to find a job, which is exactly why many governments require those who are 
unemployed to be actively looking for employment. If a blockchain technology was 
implemented here its goal would be to make it easier to see how many jobs beneficiaries have 
applied for. The blockchain could confirm that people have applied for jobs, which would then 
be used in conjunction with a smart contract to validate their benefit. If this works effectively 
then there should be less time spent monitoring beneficiaries, enabling more time to be spent 
helping them get jobs. The overall effect of the blockchain technology can be seen by 
comparing the average time beneficiaries spend unemployed with and without the 
blockchain technology. A more sophisticated method would be to run a simple regression 
analysis using time series information on time spent unemployed, other variables that likely 





variable measuring one after the blockchain implementation and zero otherwise.  The size 
and significance of the coefficient for the blockchain dummy reveals if the blockchain has 
been impactful at reducing the number of days spent unemployed.  
From a property-rights perspective, blockchain technology tries to reduce the cost and 
time associated with accessing information. The medical information example in Section 4 
can be used as an example here. Currently, medical data is stored by medical institutions, 
which causes problems when an individual goes to a different medical institution from where 
their data is stored. The main issues are the lack of accuracy introduced by the transfer of 
data and the time it takes to transfer the data - in the U.S.A it can take as long as 60 days to 
transfer medical information (Azaria et al., 2016). The lack of accuracy and wait for 
information to be transferred have been proven to have significant undesirable effects 
especially in areas concerning patient safety and continuity of care (Kripalani et al., 2007). If 
a digital wallet is implemented, then the accuracy should increase and the time delays should 
decrease significantly. The best way to measure the effect of this blockchain technology is to 
measure the time to transfer medical information and the amount of errors present in the 
data. One could simply compare the before and after values or run a similar regression as 
described above on time series data where a dummy for the blockchain is included. A value-
of-life calculation could also be made by comparing the impact of the problems caused by 
delayed information or errors on an individual’s quality of life. Again, to see the impact of the 
blockchain, a simple before and after comparison could be made or one could use regression 
analysis. 
The macroeconomic level accounts for the impact of the many different types of 
blockchains – one perhaps targeting the healthcare industry and another attempting to 
increase transaction speed – and attempts to measure the net macroeconomic benefit of 
these blockchains. Expected macroeconomic benefits include increased GDP and labour 
productivity as the blockchain works to reduce the inefficiencies highlighted in this paper. The 
general difficulty in estimating the benefits of blockchain technologies ex-post, especially at 
the macroeconomic level, is in isolating the effects of the blockchain-related 
infrastructure/legislation. At the macroeconomic level, modelling blockchain adoption with a 
simple dummy variable fails to capture the intensity of blockchain adoption across sectors 
and across time. Thus, a simple regression analysis that we suggested above for the 





estimates. Furthermore, even if the dummy variable approach was acceptable, it is difficult 
to have confidence that the coefficient for the blockchain dummy is capturing the effect of 
the blockchain instead of some other variable outside of the model that moved at the same 
time. To counteract these issues, we suggest using a synthetic control country to carry out 
regression analysis (Abadie et al., 2015), discussed below.  
Take a model the goal of which is to find out the proportion of GDP that is attributed 
to the use of blockchain technologies. Our theory is that blockchain use increases the 
productivity of labour within a country, leading to a growth in real GDP, and therefore we 
would expect the study country to have a jump in GDP after the implementation of 
blockchain. As discussed above, because there are too many variables that contribute to the 
GDP and because not all can be measured in the model, it is questionable whether a 
significant coefficient for the blockchain dummy can be interpreted as the effect of the 
blockchain technologies. What we really would like is a country that is otherwise the same as 
our study country but that has not adopted blockchain technologies, in which case we could 
see if their growth paths diverge after the implementation of the blockchain technologies in 
our study country. Given the low likelihood of finding this identical twin, a synthetic control 
country can be created by a statistical program that finds countries and weights so that the 
weighted average of the countries together mimics the economy of our study country. 
Comparing the GDP growth paths of our study country and the synthetic twin gives us our 
best shot of finding the real effects of widespread blockchain use.   
There are many difficulties in creating an accurate synthetic control country, however. 
What variables should we control for? Do these countries have differing levels of blockchain 
use themselves that would affect GDP? Having said that, studies estimating impacts of 
different shocks have found success using the synthetic control method, and we could look 
to these for guidance. For example, a study of the impact of increased terrorism in Basque on 
the region’s real per capita GDP found a 10% drop post terrorism using a synthetic control of 
other Spanish counties (Abadie & Gardeazabal, 2003). An example of an early adopter is 
Estonia that in 2012 revealed itself as the most blockchain-friendly country in the world, using 
the technology in several sectors. Estonia could therefore prove to be a suitable testing 
ground to estimate macroeconomic effects of widespread blockchain use. However, we may 
need to wait a while before the impact of blockchain can be seen in GDP, even for an early 







In conclusion, literature has shown that information asymmetry, transaction costs and moral 
hazard create market inefficiencies in core governmental services. Reducing some of the 
market frictions created by unreliable or incomplete information is a huge issue that plagues 
many governments across the globe. Blockchain provides recordkeeping services that would 
solve many of these issues outlined in this paper. We believe that the advantages from 
blockchain arise from increased reliability and access to information for the government. 
Blockchain technologies have a huge potential to reduce inefficiencies in government and, 
due to the sheer size of governments, make a large difference in a country’s economic 
wellbeing.  
There is future potential for empirical studies examining the differences in 
quantitative benefits between traditional data keeping methods and storing information on 
the blockchain. Some strategies for ex-post analysis were discussed in Section 6. Another 
possibly fruitful approach, especially in countries that are yet to implement blockchain 
technologies, is to start by measuring the current inefficiencies public services, which would 
help rank order the areas where blockchain could make the biggest impact and incentivise 
the implementation of blockchain technology, yielding ultimately positive outcomes for tax 
payers. One key area we suggest looking into is the cost of obtaining and securing property 
rights, administrative costs in supply chain contracts and costs of administering a tax system. 
Economic gains of blockchain occur through aggregate data collection in one place, 
which is why we do not recommend partial national implementation on a trial basis but 
instead suggest full trials to be implemented in smaller towns or cities by local city council. If 
implemented nationwide, looking at specific self-contained issues would be recommended. 
If installing a new blockchain system is undesirable on a trial basis we recommend using 
Estonia as a treatment county. One of Estonia’s key implementation areas is healthcare which 
we recommend looking into as it provides some evidence of how these policies have helped 
Estonia so far. Comparing Estonia to other similar countries would provide an indication on 
the benefits blockchain provides towards a countries’ economic wellbeing.  
There are numerous examples of governments around the world pouring money into 
blockchain research funds in an attempt to better understand roles for the technology. For 





in a cattle slaughterhouse, a place where inspection and collation of data is a top priority 
(Food Standards Agency, 2018). It seems that the question is not “if” anymore but “when”. 
As governments gain a better understanding of the possible roles for blockchain they will be 
better able to write effective regulations that encourage blockchain integration.  
Issues with the accuracy of blockchain data still exist as human error of inputting data 
could still detract from the quality of information submitted to the blockchain. Efforts must 
be made to make any data input process automated or extremely straightforward. 
Innovations, such as product tags that are attached to objects at the beginning of the 
production process and are sensed at each location the product is transported to, could 
provide a ledger of exact locations, dates, and times of when and where that object has been, 
all without the requirement of a third party or the risk of human error from recordkeeping. 
Furthermore, while human error cannot be completely ruled out, once any inaccuracies are 
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